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NOTES 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
AND INSURANCE REGULATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Senator Hillary Clinton believes insurance companies should be 
regulated more heavily: “We’re going to tell the insurance companies 
that they’re going to have to change the way they do busi-
ness . . . . You know, we regulate banks.  We regulate utilities.  Well, 
we’re going to regulate the insurance companies.”1  While Clinton may 
simply have been throwing red meat to an audience on the campaign 
trail, her comments raise questions about proper and effective ap-
proaches to regulation of the insurance industry.  She is certainly cor-
rect that other industries have long been regulated,2 but her phrasing 
suggests an adversarial approach to regulation in which the govern-
ment imposes requirements about how to behave on an unwilling pri-
vate sector.3  Recent scholarship suggests that regulatory processes are 
more collaborative in nature, with the government engaging in formal 
and informal contracts with regulated entities in the private sector to 
achieve regulatory goals.4 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1 Abdon M. Pallasch, Hillary Slams Health Insurers; Pledges To Regulate Insurance Compa-
nies, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (the classic ex-
plication of the administrative state by one of its leading intellectual champions); THOMAS K. 
MCGRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) (documenting the history of various seminal fig-
ures of regulation). 
3 The traditional administrative law view of the relationship between regulators and regu-
lated entities is one of hierarchy with adverse parties.  See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2000) (“Most administrative law theory now 
adheres to a hierarchical, agency-centered conception of administrative power . . . .”). 
4 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997); see also Philip J. Harter & George C. Eads, Policy Instruments, Institutions, and 
Objectives: An Analytical Framework for Assessing “Alternatives” to Regulation, 37 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 221, 223–27 (1985); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2029 (2005).  This collaborative governance view may represent more accurately what is 
happening on the ground, where regulators and regulated entities are working interdependently, 
sharing information, and making various negotiated deals.  See Jody Freeman, The Contracting 
State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 160–64 (2000) (connecting the contractual relationship between 
regulators and regulated entities to the trend of privatization); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew 
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 343, 346–47 nn.1–23 (2004) (collecting citations to scholarship in this tradition and 
naming the tradition the “Renew Deal”).  Some argue that even if the collaborative governance 
view is descriptively accurate, it is not normatively preferred.  See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Out-
sourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 432–34 (2003) (using transaction cost analysis 
to identify shortcomings of outsourcing government regulation). 
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A public-private partnership (PPP) is an institutional arrangement 
that embodies this type of collaborative approach; it is a joint venture 
between the government and one or more private sector entities.5  Al-
though such partnerships come in many forms, this Note focuses on 
joint financing partnerships that link public financing and private in-
surance to pay for certain social goods.  Where the financing for social 
goods is fragmented and overlapping, as it is for health and social 
care,6 joint financing PPPs may help organize existing financing 
streams.  This Note argues that partnerships of this type also present 
an opportunity for consumer-protective regulation of the insurance in-
dustry if certain conditions are met.  Private insurers must perceive 
benefits to the partnership, government actors must be motivated to 
protect the government’s financial stake, and government interests 
must align with those of consumers.  This Note uses the Medicaid 
Partnership for Long-Term Care to illustrate the argument. 
Part II identifies the objective of consumer-protective regulation, 
discusses the collaborative form of the public-private partnership, and 
specifies the conditions under which PPPs might create opportunities 
for consumer-protective regulation of the insurance industry.  Part III 
describes the history and results of the Medicaid Partnership for Long-
Term Care.  Part IV analyzes the results of the Partnership in light of 
the conceptual framework set out in Part II.  Part V concludes. 
II. OBJECTIVE AND METHOD
A.  The Objective: Public-Interested Regulation, 
Consumer-Protective Regulation 
Regulation for regulation’s sake is not a worthy goal.  Lacking jus-
tification, intervention in the economy is bound to lead to undesirable 
inefficiencies and a reduction in liberty.7  But regulation is desirable if 
it provides sufficiently large benefits to the general public.  Thus, the 
objective might be identified as public-interested regulation, or “regu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
5 See Stephen H. Linder, Coming to Terms with the Public-Private Partnership: A Grammar 
of Multiple Meanings, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 19, 19 (Pauline Vaillancourt 
Rosenau ed., 2000) (defining public-private partnerships as “cooperative ventures between the 
state and private business”); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public 
Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1614–15 (2001) (noting the importance of 
for-profit and nonprofit entities in public-private arrangements).  
6 See Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 799 (“The 
current multifaceted system of Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, Medigap insurance in its 
twelve variations, and long-term care insurance in its even more numerous mutations, plus Medi-
caid for people who have exhausted their financial resources, is simply too fragmented.”). 
7 See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Tak-
ings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 293–95 (1999) (discussing the perils of insurance regulation 
without justification). 
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lation that improves social welfare . . . [,] delivers no rents[,] or, if it 
does, [ensures that] the gains to those who benefit from the regulatory 
decision outweigh any losses to the rest of society.”8  Public-interested 
regulation is contrasted with special interest regulation, which “deliv-
ers regulatory rents to the greater detriment of society.”9 
This distinction could be cast in terms of the types of groups bene-
fited or harmed by regulation — in other words, as a distinction be-
tween small groups with narrow interests and broad groups with dif-
fuse interests.10  Reduced to its essence, public-interested regulation 
benefits large groups over small groups, though it could also benefit 
both.11  In the insurance context, insurance companies are the small 
group with narrow interests, and consumers are the broad group with 
diffuse interests.12  Thus, under this framework, consumer-protective 
regulation of the insurance industry is a type of public-interested regu-
lation that benefits consumers.  Although there is room for debate over 
which types of regulations actually improve the welfare of consumers, 
such debates are best had on a case-by-case basis.13  For the purposes 
of this Note, the broad definitions above are sufficient.14 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
8 STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 10 (2008).  
9 Id. 
10 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (arguing 
that smaller groups are better able to organize than larger groups, because in smaller groups the 
costs of participation are more likely outweighed by the more concentrated benefits). 
11 See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 8 n.1 (2000) 
(“‘[P]ublic interested’ regulation is used in contradistinction to ‘special interest’ regulation, where 
the former refers to regulation that promotes diffuse interests while the latter describes the deliv-
ery of rents to narrow groups. . . . ‘Public interested’ regulation represents the category of ‘be-
nign’ regulation that stands in opposition to the ‘bad’ regulation interest group theorists usually 
fear.  Public interested regulation needs no further specification than to say that it aims at vindi-
cating the preferences of diffuse interests, and it delivers no regulatory rents.”).   
12 In fact, Professor Mancur Olson identifies consumers as the quintessential broad group with 
diffuse interests that has difficulty organizing, especially as compared with organized economic 
interests.  See OLSON, supra note 10, at 143 (“The multitude of workers, consumers, white-collar 
workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special circumstances, but business interests are 
organized as a general rule.”); see also id. at 166 (“The consumers are at least as numerous as any 
other group in the society, but they have no organization to countervail the power of organized or 
monopolistic producers.”). 
13 The civic republican tradition suggests that through deliberation the public interest can be 
furthered in public law.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 29, 45–48 (1995) (deriving deliberative democracy from both the Federalist and Antifed-
eralist strains in American political thought); see also Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1493, 1510–13 (1988) (discussing the possibilities of persuasive processes).  The administrative 
state, in turn, could be seen as the institution capable of realizing this deliberative goal.  See, e.g., 
Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1617, 1631–41 (1985); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1541–62 (1992).  
14 This Note aims to identify a set of conditions that might generate such public-interested 
regulation, and it accepts the view that firms pursue their self-interest in dealing with the gov-
ernment and state regulators.  However, the broader debate about whether public-interested regu-
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B.  The Method: Collaborative Governance  
and Public-Private Partnerships 
With the objective of consumer-protective regulation identified, this 
section attempts to identify a method that might have promise for 
achieving that objective.  The model of regulation implied by Senator 
Clinton is one of hierarchy, in which the state imposes regulations on 
private actors from above.15  Some scholars, however, have challenged 
this model’s descriptive accuracy as well as its normative appeal, pro-
posing instead a model in which regulators and regulated entities co-
operate to achieve common objectives, share information, and negoti-
ate deals.16  Public-private partnerships are emblematic of such an 
approach.  They are less likely to involve hierarchical relationships be-
cause their existence requires the consent of both the government and 
the private actors.  In fact, their success depends crucially upon the 
buy-in of both parties. 
PPPs are usually geared toward the creation of a social good, such 
as education or health.  All such goods have both a financing and a 
provision dimension, where financing concerns how to pay for the 
good and provision concerns how the good will be produced or the 
service delivered.17  Responsibility for either dimension may be allo-
cated partially or wholly to public or private actors.18  Public financing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
lation is plausible and possible or naïve and improbable is bracketed here.  The literature on pub-
lic choice and capture theories espousing the latter view is vast, but for some key pieces, see 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT, reprinted in 2 
THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 16–29 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2004); 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 58 (2d ed. 1979); GEORGE J. STIGLER, Sup-
plementary Note on Economic Theories of Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 137, 
137–41 (1975); Jeffrey M. Berry, Subgovernments, Issue Networks, and Political Conflict, in 
REMAKING AMERICAN POLITICS 239, 256 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 1989); 
and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 
341–44 (1974).  For criticisms of this approach, see, for example, Geoffrey Brennan & James M. 
Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?: The Case for the “Nobel” Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179 (1988) 
(discussing ethical critiques of public choice theory); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: In-
corporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41–56 (1998) (arguing that such an 
account fails to take notice of the benefits of administrative procedures); and Mark Kelman, On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public 
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988) (applying critical legal studies analysis to public 
choice theory). 
 15 This is the view associated with the New Deal and the birth of the administrative state.  See 
Lobel, supra note 4, at 351–52.  It is a development of a previous understanding in which the role 
of government was limited to facilitating “private orderings” through “freedom of contract and 
property security.”  See id. at 362. 
 16 See supra notes 3–4. 
 17 See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 7 (1989). 
 18 For simplicity, this Note considers only two sectors, public and private, including nonprofit 
entities and families within the private sphere.  Of course, nonprofits and families do not share 
the same incentives or goals as for-profit entities.  For interesting discussions of the nature and 
composition of the nonprofit sector, see THE STUDY OF THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE 
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involves collective payment for goods, for instance, through taxation or 
social insurance; private financing involves individuals or other pri-
vate sector entities using their own resources to pay for goods.  Pub-
licly provided goods come from a governmental source; privately pro-
vided goods come from nongovernmental sources, such as for-profit 
firms, nonprofit entities, or family members.  Because the financing 
and provision dimensions are independent of each other, one can imag-
ine four types of goods: publicly financed and provided (e.g., public 
schools), privately financed and provided (e.g., milk bought at a su-
permarket), publicly financed and privately provided (e.g., military 
equipment), and privately financed and publicly provided (e.g., the 
services of the U.S. Postal Service).19 
Although public-private partnerships are far from new,20 they have 
been the subject of renewed interest because of a recent trend toward 
privatization.21  Privatization involves moving some of the responsibil-
ity for the financing or provision of a good from the public to the pri-
vate sphere.22  For goods that used to be entirely publicly financed and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(Helmut Anheier & Avner Ben-Ner eds., 2003).  For a history of the attack on the public/private 
distinction, see Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1426 (1982).  For an analysis of the difficulty in applying the public/private distinction 
to long-term care, see Mark Schlesinger, Deceptive Dichotomies: Political Reasoning and Gov-
ernment Involvement in Long-Term Care, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
LONG-TERM CARE 25, 32–35 (Leslie C. Walker, Elizabeth H. Bradley & Terrie Wetle eds., 1998). 
19 See DONAHUE, supra note 17, at 7–8 (discussing these four categories). 
20 See DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE
MARKETS 4 (1993) (noting that “every major policy initiative launched by the federal government 
since World War II — including Medicare and Medicaid, environmental cleanup and restoration, 
antipoverty programs and job training, interstate highways and sewage treatment plants — has 
been managed through public-private partnerships” (emphasis removed)); Henry Hansmann, The 
Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and 
Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 245 (Victor R. Fuchs 
ed., 1996) (detailing the history of intersectoral cooperation in social services). 
21 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1292–93 (2003). 
22 Privatization also implies a move from collective to individual decisionmaking.  See Mark 
H. Moore, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (2003); see also 
William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies 
on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321 (2001) (detailing various privatization schemes 
across the world).  Privatization has foundations in certain conservative philosophies, particularly 
those that critique the collectivization of social goods under the banner of the state and that valor-
ize the market as distributing social goods according to desert.  See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD 
TO SERFDOM (1976).  Although economists are divided on privatization issues, many favor pri-
vatization on so-called efficiency grounds.  See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. 
VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998).  
Those interested in public administration focus on the perspective of policy planners, for whom 
privatization may be a way to deal with stress on public budgets as well as complaints about the 
quality of delivery of goods and social services.  See Harvey B. Feigenbaum & Jeffrey R. Henig, 
The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A Typology, 46 WORLD POL. 185, 187, 193–96 
(1994). 
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provided, privatization often results in hybrid financing/provision ar-
rangements that are characteristic of PPPs.  The most common form of 
PPP in the United States is a “contracting out” arrangement — a pair-
ing of public financing with private provision.23  Examples of con-
tracting-out PPPs include school voucher programs, privatized prisons, 
and publicly financed faith-based initiatives.24  
A different sort of PPP involves both public and private financing. 
This arrangement might be termed a joint financing public-private 
partnership.25  Private financing may come in the form of out-of-
pocket spending by individuals, or it may be systematized into finan-
cial products such as insurance.  This Note’s inquiry is limited to pri-
vate financing involving an insurance mechanism of some sort; exam-
ples of such joint financing PPPs include the use of governmental tax 
credits to help people purchase insurance,26 the government’s acting as 
a reinsurer for private insurance companies,27 and the government’s 
making receipt of government money contingent upon the purchase of 
private insurance.28  An obvious precondition for the existence of a 
joint financing PPP is the availability of public and private financing 
streams geared toward a given social good.  If these financing streams 
already exist, the PPP performs a linking function between them. 
Otherwise, the PPP creates a source of financing, usually on the public 
side, to act in concert with a private financing stream that is already in 
place. 
Unlike contracting-out PPPs, which often derive from a privatiza-
tion impulse, joint financing PPPs derive from a desire to take advan-
tage of multiple sources of financing for the same social good.  The 
combination of private insurance and public money is an attractive ar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
23 See Freeman, supra note 21, at 1289 (noting that “‘privatization,’ . . . in the American con-
text[,] consists largely of contracting out”). 
24 See generally MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002) (discussing the development of PPPs in many areas). 
25 Joint financing PPPs may involve either public or private provision of a good.  For present 
purposes, it is not necessary to specify the provision aspect, so long as there is some supply of the 
good toward which the financing is aimed.  
26 See, e.g., Joshua M. Wiener, Jane Tilly & Susan M. Goldenson, Federal and State Initiatives 
To Jump Start the Market for Private Long-Term Care Insurance, 8 ELDER L.J. 57, 67–70 (2000) 
(discussing the tax credit approach for helping finance the purchase of long-term care insurance). 
27 See, e.g., Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate Change: A Commen-
tary, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875, 1885–89 (2007) (discussing the role of government in the insurance 
market for damage caused by climate change); Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against 
Terrorism — and Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 276–82 (2003) (describing the government as 
reinsurer for damages caused by terrorist attacks).  See generally DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL 
ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 292–325 (2002) (laying out the his-
tory and rationale for American risk management policy, implemented through various govern-
mental interventions and programs). 
28 This is the approach of the Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care, which is discussed in 
Part III below. 
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rangement for dealing with the fragmentation of financing for impor-
tant social goods.  However, despite their separation from the trend of 
privatization, joint financing PPPs may be vulnerable to some of the 
criticisms that are leveled at contracting-out PPPs.  For example, some 
public law scholars criticize the removal to private actors of either the 
financing or provision of social goods, arguing that it undermines de-
mocratic or constitutional values such as accountability, due process, 
and rationality.29  This critique is in a sense historical, attacking the 
fact that responsibility for social goods has been transferred from the 
public to the private sphere over time.  In another sense, however, the 
critique could be construed as attacking any private financing or pro-
vision of social goods.30  Taken this way, the critique could apply 
equally well to joint financing PPPs and contracting-out 
arrangements.  
Some have responded to these criticisms by arguing that public-
private partnerships allow the government to extend public law norms 
to private actors through contract and regulation.31  Taking this idea 
one step further, this Note argues that joint financing PPPs could help 
facilitate consumer-protective regulation of private insurance compa-
nies under certain conditions.  Normally, consumer-protective regula-
tion is justified and pursued by regulators under rationales such as pa-
ternalism or the need to remedy inadequate information or unequal 
bargaining power.32  In the case of joint financing PPPs, however, the 
regulation may be pursued because of the dynamics described below. 
C.  Linking Method to Objective 
When private insurance and public financing are linked, the gov-
ernment and the private sector jointly take on risk for the financing of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
29 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246–55 (2003) (laying out the “reasons for concern” about the trend to-
ward public-private partnerships); see also PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: 
WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007) (focusing criticism on contracting-out PPPs). 
30 In other words, public control of financing or provision could be seen as a superior way of 
organizing affairs, as it allows public values to be expressed.  See, e.g., Mark. R. Meiners, Public-
Private Partnerships in Long-Term Care, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 18, at 115, 121 (“[A]rguments against the [Medicaid Long-Term 
Care Insurance] Partnership were raised primarily by social insurance advocates, who viewed the 
program as an incremental step that would erode support for more ambitious reform.”).   
31 See Freeman, supra note 21, at 1285.  Thus, parallel processes of privatization and publici-
zation — the process “through which private actors increasingly commit themselves to tradition-
ally public goals” — could proceed in tandem.  Id.  In the context of local government law, Pro-
fessor Gerald Frug has defined publicization as the process of “bringing government closer to its 
constituents.”  See Gerald E. Frug, Is Secession from the City of Los Angeles a Good Idea?, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1783, 1784 (2002). 
32 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26–28, 32–34 (1982) (discussing 
these rationales). 
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social goods.33  They are then operating in a paradigmatically collabo-
rative way, and it is in the negotiations over the parameters of the 
joint financing PPP that opportunities for the promulgation of con-
sumer-protective regulation may appear, provided certain conditions 
are met.  First, the insurance industry must see the PPP as beneficial.  
Second, government actors must be able to seize upon the opportunity 
to protect governmental interests.  Third, the interests of the govern-
ment and consumers must be aligned. 
1.  Private Sector Benefits. — For-profit private sector entities seek 
profit, and they pursue opportunities for profit when they are aware of 
them.  Insurance companies would thus welcome a joint financing 
partnership to the extent that it would expand the market and net 
profits.  The companies would weigh the costs of increased regulation 
associated with the partnership against the economic benefits of the 
partnership as a whole, and they would accept a partnership arrange-
ment in which benefits exceeded costs.  To be sure, not all joint financ-
ing PPPs would provide the private sector with benefits.  Insurance 
companies would presumably resist any arrangement in which the 
government merely shifted financial risk to them.34  But certain factors 
increase the likelihood that insurance companies would benefit from 
partnership with the government.  If the government provided funding 
directly to individuals for the purchase of insurance, insurance compa-
nies would benefit from the increased demand for their policies.  
Moreover, companies that insure against particularly unpredictable 
events would welcome government assistance to help insulate them 
from risk.  Finally, insurers in markets in which consumer distrust 
runs high would benefit from a positive association with the govern-
ment, which could be used in marketing to allay consumer fears about 
market instability or poor company reputation.  This type of benefit is 
analogous to the benefits of perceived stability and viability that flow 
to securities or banking firms when the government intervenes to 
structure those markets.35 
2.  Regulator Motivation. — In order for public-interested aims to 
be realized, government actors must be motivated to achieve them.36  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See Linder, supra note 5, at 29–30 (conceptualizing the risk-shifting function of public-
private partnerships). 
 34 This may explain why, as discussed in Part III below, standard long-term care insurance 
policies have been regulated far less heavily than policies associated with the Medicaid Partner-
ship for Long-Term Care. 
 35 See JOHN FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 20 (1993) (“In the areas of finance, 
banking, and insurance, questions of equilibrium often appear along with risk as compelling ar-
guments for regulation.”). 
 36 See Croley, supra note 11, at 29–31 (discussing the importance of administrator motivation 
to public-interested regulation); Freeman, supra note 21, at 1329–35 (noting that administrators 
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In the case of a joint financing PPP, the government’s interest in regu-
lation might be to safeguard consumers of insurance products or to 
protect the public fisc.  But even if the insurance industry is receptive 
to regulation because of the other benefits of the PPP, insurance regu-
lators will not necessarily act to protect the government’s interest.37  
Regulators may be captured by the entities they regulate, or they may 
be pressured by the legislative or executive branch to pursue regula-
tion that does not benefit the general public.38 
Capture, however, is not inevitable.  Regulators may be ideologi-
cally motivated to pursue their own conception of the public interest.39  
In addition, administrative procedures may insulate regulators from 
corrupting legislative influence,40 the judiciary may provide a check on 
decisions that would favor special interests in an arbitrary way,41 or 
the executive branch may direct more public-interested action.42  If 
one or several of these motivations or pressures lead administrators to 
regulate in the public interest, then these regulators can be said to 
have successfully policed the parameters or assumptions of the PPP, 
ensuring that enough risk has been allocated to the private sector to 
make the PPP worthwhile for the government. 
3.  Alignment of Interests. — In addition to private sector benefits 
and regulator motivation, consumer-protective regulation requires an 
alignment between consumer and government interests.  Given that 
the government’s motivation may be based on a desire to promote 
some conception of the public interest or to protect the public fisc, or 
both, there is ample opportunity for a misalignment to occur.  First, 
regulators might misinterpret the interests of the general public or 
misunderstand the market that they are regulating, in which case they 
might pursue regulation that is actually harmful to consumers.  This 
mistake is likely if the government adopts a top-down approach to 
regulation and refuses to accept input from regulated entities.  Second, 
in an effort to protect public money, regulators might shift too much 
risk to the private sector, overregulating the insurance industry, for in-
stance, by requiring that policies cover a variety of costly situations for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
must be motivated to extend public law norms to private actors for the process of publicization to 
function). 
 37 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000) (argu-
ing that governmental officials are not necessarily responsive to the government’s financial  
interests). 
 38 See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in THE CITIZEN 
AND THE STATE, supra note 14, at 114, 114–28. 
 39 See Croley, supra note 11, at 29–31. 
 40 See id. at 31–49. 
 41 See id. at 49–53. 
 42 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2335–38, 
2372–83 (2001). 
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extended periods of time.  Such action would drive up the cost of in-
surance, pricing lower-income consumers out of the market and 
thereby depriving them of the benefits of the partnership.  Govern-
ment must balance what is feasible for the insurance industry with 
what is necessary to achieve adequate financing of a given social good, 
all the while taking account of the importance of consumer choice. 
These three conditions — private sector benefits, regulator motiva-
tion, and alignment of government and consumer interests — are all 
necessary to open up the opportunities for consumer-protective regula-
tion of the insurance industry.  The first condition guarantees that the 
private sector will have an incentive to enter into a partnership with 
the government.  Buy-in is a necessary component of such arrange-
ments.  The second condition ensures that the government will see the 
partnership as an opportunity to regulate.  The third condition ensures 
that the promulgated regulation will actually benefit consumers by 
taking stock of the insurance market and properly weighing price, con-
sumer choice, and other factors. 
In support of this argument, the next Part describes a case in which 
all three conditions were met and consumer-protective regulation ap-
pears to have resulted. 
III.  THE MEDICAID PARTNERSHIP FOR LONG-TERM CARE 
This Part describes the Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care, 
a joint financing PPP directed toward the social good of long-term 
care.43  The Partnership links two independent financing streams — 
the long-term care financing provided by Medicaid, and private long-
term care insurance (LTCI) — through the creation of a new long-term 
care insurance product.  This Partnership product exists alongside the 
standard LTCI product, and both are subject to state insurance regula-
tion.  The differences between the two regulatory regimes are sugges-
tive of how the joint financing PPP institutional arrangement can in-
fluence regulatory outcomes.44 
A.  The Social Good: Long-Term Care 
Long-term care is “broadly defined as an array of health care, per-
sonal care, and social services generally provided over a sustained pe-
riod of time to persons with chronic conditions and with functional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Technically, since Medicaid finances long-term care that is provided on a private basis, a 
PPP of the contracting-out variety exists independently of any joint financing arrangement.  
However, this Note focuses on the joint financing PPPs, and the fact that long-term care may be 
provided on a private basis is not relevant to the analysis. 
 44  Moreover, because the federal government recently loosened restrictions on states’ partici-
pation in the Partnership program, see infra p. 1380, an analysis of these differences is useful to 
understanding how future states may choose to regulate LTCI policies. 
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limitations.”45  Depending on the nature of the condition or limitation, 
an individual requiring long-term care may have difficulty performing 
certain activities of daily living, such as communicating, dressing, go-
ing to the bathroom, or eating.  In addition, such an individual may 
have trouble with instrumental activities such as financial manage-
ment or shopping.  
Although many caregivers are employed through formal market 
mechanisms, relatives and family members provide the bulk of long-
term-care services, and this informal care is generally unpaid.46  The 
caregiving workforce is predominantly female,47 and the need for sepa-
rate financing mechanisms arises perhaps because various social trends 
contribute to the inadequacy or unavailability of this traditional, un-
paid female workforce.  For example, population aging has increased 
the number of individuals needing care, and women have moved into 
the workforce in large numbers.48  Since individuals can no longer rely 
primarily on family support, the commodification of the provision of 
long-term care has been necessary to increase supply.49  Two sources of 
support — Medicaid on the public side and long-term care insurance 
on the private side — have evolved to deal with the need for further 
financing.50 
B.  Financing Mechanisms 
1.  The Public Financing Mechanism: Medicaid. — Medicaid51 is a 
means-tested program that is jointly funded by the federal and state 
governments and administered by the states.  It is the somewhat acci-
dental public payment program for long-term care, as it was originally 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE 27 
(Gooloo S. Wunderlich & Peter O. Kohler eds., 2001). 
 46 See James J. Callahan, Jr., Care in the Home and Other Community Settings: Present and 
Future, in THE FUTURE OF LONG-TERM CARE 169, 171 (Robert H. Binstock, Leighton E. 
Cluff & Otto von Mering eds., 1996). 
 47 See ELAINE M. BRODY, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT CARE YEARS 5 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 48 See id. at 7–22 (describing the demographic changes). 
 49 For an argument that such commodification is desirable, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodi-
fication and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997). 
 50 It is unlikely that such financing will cause family caregiving to disappear or even decrease 
substantially, as studies both nationally and internationally have shown that formal care services 
do not substitute for informal care services; they are merely supplementary.  For the national con-
text, see Sharon L. Tennstedt, Sybil L. Crawford & John B. McKinlay, Is Family Care on the De-
cline?: A Longitudinal Investigation of the Substitution of Formal Long-Term Care Services for 
Informal Care, 71 MILBANK Q. 601 (1993).  For international studies, see FAMILY SUPPORT FOR 
THE ELDERLY: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Hal L. Kendig, Akiko Hashimoto & 
Larry C. Coppard eds., 1992). 
 51 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1369–1396v (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
  
1378 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1367  
intended to provide health care for the poor.52  However, in 2005, ap-
proximately one-third of the Medicaid budget, or close to $95 billion, 
was devoted to long-term care expenses, primarily in nursing homes.53  
In fact, nearly forty percent of all expenditures on nursing home facili-
ties are Medicaid dollars.54  
Federal guidelines prescribe general rules that states must follow to 
receive matching funds for their activities, but states have some leeway 
in constructing eligibility guidelines.  As a result, eligibility for Medi-
caid varies by state.55  The federal government also provides waivers 
from its normal rules, and the long-term care context has been rich in 
waiver activity.  For example, Medicaid money for long-term care has 
traditionally been directed toward nursing care, but under a popular 
Medicaid waiver program, several states have experimented with fi-
nancing home and community-based long-term care services.56  Many 
of these waiver programs become semi-permanent, though they can be 
changed by Congress, as the history of the Medicaid Partnership for 
Long-Term Care shows.57 
2.  The Private Financing Mechanism: Long-Term Care Insurance. 
— Long-term care insurance is meant to insure against the nonmedical 
costs of disability, as opposed to the acute medical costs associated 
with illness, which are covered by traditional health insurance.  LTCI 
policies provide indemnity coverage; after meeting a requisite level of 
disability defined by set benefit triggers, the policy makes fixed dollar 
payments for each unit of service received (such as a day of nursing 
home care or a day of home care), regardless of the actual cost of the 
service.58  For a given premium, the per-unit allowance varies depend-
ing on the type of care.  For example, a policy that pays $100 per day 
of nursing home care might pay only $50 per day of home care.  LTCI 
generally pays benefits only for a fixed period, such as two years of 
nursing home care, with longer coverage costing more.59 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION 
MAKING 128 (2006) (“Although originally enacted to pay for the acute care costs of low-income 
individuals, over the years the [Medicaid] program’s support for nursing home care for ‘needy’ 
elderly has become a costly aspect of the program.”). 
 53 See LAURA SUMMER, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING PROJECT, 
MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE (Jan. 2007), available at http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/ 
medicaid2006.pdf. 
 54 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 8 
(2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5400&type=1. 
 55 See FROLIK, supra note 52, at 128–29. 
 56 See id. at 129. 
 57 See infra p. 1380. 
 58 See STEPHANIE LEWIS ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REGULATION 
OF PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 2 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
insurance/6073-index.cfm. 
 59 See id. 
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Long-term care insurance is a relatively new form of insurance, 
having been offered for the first time in the mid-1970s and marketed 
heavily only since the 1980s.  Its early history was tarnished with re-
ports of marketing abuses.60  Consumers report similar problems today 
with denials of coverage,61 which have led to demands for inquiries 
into the conduct of long-term care insurance companies.62  Insurance 
regulation is primarily a state matter.63  The National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), an organization of state insurance 
regulators, has developed uniform standards for long-term care insur-
ance regulation.64  Although many states have adopted these recom-
mendations in whole or in part, the degree of consumer protection in 
state regulations varies.65 
C.  The Linkage: The Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care 
The Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care works by encourag-
ing consumers to purchase private long-term care insurance in ex-
change for asset protection under Medicaid rules.  In other words, the 
Partnership permits an individual who has purchased long-term care 
insurance to transition to Medicaid after the insurance policy runs out, 
even if she would otherwise have too many resources to qualify for 
Medicaid.66  The Partnership links two financing streams for long-
term care that had previously operated independently: the LTCI mar-
ket handles the front end, and the state picks up at least some of the 
back end.  This arrangement makes LTCI policies less expensive, pro-
vided there is no accompanying cost-increasing regulation, because the 
government has taken on some of the responsibility for insuring poli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 See id. at 5. 
 61 See Charles Duhigg, Aged, Frail, and Denied Care by Their Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2007, at A1. 
 62 See Elder Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/elder_law/2007/03/nyt_article_ 
on_.html (March 28, 2007) (collecting reactions to news of long-term care insurance company 
abuses). 
 63 However, the federal government reserves the right to step in.  See McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2000) (delegating to the states the authority to regulate insurance); 
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that insurance transactions 
constituted interstate commerce and thus were potentially regulable by Congress under the Com-
merce Clause). 
 64 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE MODEL 
REGULATION, in 4 MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 641-1 (2007). 
 65 See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 58, at x–xii. 
 66 California, Connecticut, and Indiana offer “dollar for dollar” asset protection up to the 
amount of insurance purchased.  New York uses a “total assets” model, in which all assets are 
protected so long as the insurance policy pays out benefits for a certain amount of time.  See 
Janice Cooper Pasaba & Alison Barnes, Public-Private Partnerships and Long-Term Care: Time 
for a Re-Examination?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 529, 545–47 & n.93 (1996).   
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cyholders.67  The program is supposed to encourage middle-class indi-
viduals to purchase long-term care insurance instead of engaging in 
complex estate planning or spending down their resources in order to 
qualify for Medicaid.68  Avoiding these situations would theoretically 
have the effect of more efficiently allocating societal resources and sav-
ing the government money.69 
Starting with seed money from the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion, four states — California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York — 
piloted Partnership programs under Medicaid waivers.70  However, 
Congress restricted this activity with the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993,71 preventing additional states from pursuing Partner-
ship Medicaid waivers.  Legislators passed these restrictions out of a 
concern that the Partnership programs were not lessening pressure on 
public budgets and were allowing higher-income individuals who 
would have purchased LTCI anyway to access Medicaid resources for 
which they would not otherwise have been eligible.72 
More recently, the Deficit Reduction Act of 200573 (DRA) loosened 
the restrictions on states’ engagement in the Partnership program.  
Since then, at least twenty-one more states have moved to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to create and implement a Partnership pro-
gram.74  The provisions of the DRA set a regulatory floor that incorpo-
rates many sections of the NAIC’s model regulation;75 however, states 
are free to enact more consumer-protective regulations. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 See Wiener, Tilly & Goldenson, supra note 26, at 84 (“The key observation supporting the 
public-private approaches is that long-term care insurance products that cover shorter periods of 
nursing home and home care are less expensive and more affordable than policies that cover 
longer periods of care.”). 
 68 See FROLIK, supra note 52, at 133–34. 
 69 Whether the Partnership actually saves money is open to debate.  See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 
INCLUDE BENEFITS THAT PROTECT POLICYHOLDERS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO RESULT 
IN MEDICAID SAVINGS 9–10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07231.pdf. 
 70 See JULIE STONE-AXELRAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID’S LONG-TERM 
CARE INSURANCE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 1–2 (2005), available at http://www.law. 
umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL3261001212005.pdf.  Connecticut was the 
first to request a waiver.  Id. 
 71 See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107 Stat. 312, 571 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1396p (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)). 
 72 See STONE-AXELRAD, supra note 70, at 2. 
 73 Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6021, 120 Stat. 4, 68–72 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)). 
 74 These are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington.  See ENID KASSNER, AARP PUB. POLICY 
INST., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 1 tbl.2 (2006), available at 
http://www.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/AARPFactSheet-450.pdf. 
 75 For example, the DRA requires that insurance companies develop and maintain their own 
suitability standards for determining whether consumer purchase is appropriate, see 42 U.S.C.A. 
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D.  Regulatory Outcomes 
When California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York imple-
mented their Partnership programs, they had a choice about whether 
to regulate Partnership LTCI policies in the same manner as they regu-
lated standard LTCI products.76  In each state, the regulation of the 
Partnership product was more extensive and arguably more consumer-
protective than that of standard LTCI products.77  Among other 
things, the Partnership regulations required greater standardization of 
benefit triggers,78 more extensive coverage of home care services,79 
more notification provisions to prevent unintentional policy lapse,80 
and greater data reporting requirements81 than the standard LTCI 
regulations required.  
The most interesting contrast between Partnership and standard 
LTCI regulation, however, concerns the provisions for inflation protec-
tion.  Because LTCI benefits are disbursed in terms of a fixed dollar 
amount per day, inflation has the potential to eat away at benefits over 
time.82  The earlier one buys a policy — and buying early is generally 
recommended — the more likely it is that benefits will disappear be-
fore the onset of functional limitations.  Inflation protection provisions 
increase benefits each year to take account of inflation.  Without infla-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
§ 1396p(b)(5)(A)(i)(XV), a requirement that was previously proposed by the NAIC’s model regula-
tion, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 64, § 24, at 641-38 to -39.   
 76 This is not the case for states that adopt Partnership programs under the DRA, which pro-
hibits differential regulation of Partnership and non-Partnership LTCI.  See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1396p(b)(1)(C)(iii)(VII) (prohibiting states from “impos[ing] any requirement affecting the terms 
or benefits of [a long-term care insurance] policy unless the State imposes such require-
ment . . . without regard to whether the policy is covered under the partnership or is offered in 
connection with such a partnership”). 
 77 For a summary of the different regulations, see Nelda McCall, Insurance Regulation and 
the Partnership for Long-Term Care, 16 J. INS. REG. 73 (1997). 
 78 See id. at 78–80. 
 79 See id. at 82–83, 85. 
 80 See id. at 95–97. 
 81 See id. at 97–98.  The data reporting requirements may be an attempt to extend public law 
accountability mechanisms to private actors.  See Freeman, supra note 21.  For standard policies, 
states require only “aggregate reporting of rescissions” and, in some cases, “aggregate reporting of 
. . . lapses, replacements, policies sold, [or] policies in force.”  McCall, supra note 77, at 97.  Al-
though these requirements allow some minimal degree of oversight, regulators cannot make more 
specific inquiries because the data is aggregated.  In contrast, for Partnership policies, insurance 
companies must report information on “policyholders and the characteristics of policies purchased 
(including information on changes in coverage and dropped policies); assessments for benefit eli-
gibility; claims paid as part of the policy benefit; and individuals who were denied policy cover-
age.”  Id.  The greater amount of information allows more effective monitoring of the functioning 
of the insurance product; the requirements may also act as a check on bad behavior even if states 
do not actively bring enforcement actions or support litigation by individual claimants. 
 82 For examples of how inflation protection can drastically change the benefits available, see 
Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 407, 432–33 (2007). 
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tion protection, buyers can self-insure by calculating the effect of infla-
tion on their benefits and saving up money to make up the gap.  How-
ever, it is not clear that consumers can or want to plan for long-term 
care needs so far in advance and in so much detail;83 moreover, many 
consumers cannot save enough on their own to fully cover long-term 
care expenses. 
Mandated inflation protection provisions could be categorized as a 
form of consumer-protective regulation on the theory that policies that 
do not have such a provision are defective and should not be sold on 
the open market, at least not to those for whom an insurable event is 
likely years away.84  Such regulation increases the price of policies, 
putting them outside of the price range of some consumers.  Most 
likely on these grounds, insurance companies generally oppose a re-
quirement of mandatory compound inflation protection.85  Thus, many 
states, including the Partnership states86 and states that have adopted 
the NAIC’s model regulation,87 require that standard LTCI products 
provide merely an offer of inflation protection.  However, when it 
came to regulating Partnership policies, the Partnership states all 
promulgated regulations requiring compound inflation protection.88 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Tax and Economic Responses to the Medicaid Long-Term Care 
Financing Crisis: A Behavioral Economics Approach, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
379, 390–99 (2007) (detailing how consumers experience utility losses just through the contempla-
tion of their future disabled selves). 
 84 Cf. Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for Judicial Regulation of Insurance Poli-
cies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1398 (2007) (arguing that judicial regulation of insurance 
policies is justified to ensure that insurers that issue “defective” policies provide coverage to insur-
eds, just as firms that make defective products must pay for the injuries their products cause).  
Consistent with this theory, some states that mandate inflation protection for their Partnership 
policies lift the requirement for purchasers who are above a certain age.  See, e.g., CONN. 
AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-475-4(c)(3)(B) (1999) (lifting the requirement with respect to purchasers 
over age 65).  An arguably less paternalistic method for protecting consumers would be to require 
an opt-out provision, with inflation protection being the default rule.  See Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1174–
77 (2003) (discussing the importance of default rules in structuring decisions while preserving 
freedom of choice); see also Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224–25 (2003) (dis-
cussing the relationship between defaults and status quo bias).  For a contrary view, see Gregory 
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1260–69 (2005) (argu-
ing that default rules should be set so as to maximize liberty, not welfare). 
 85 See McCall, supra note 77, at 100–01 (“[Insurance companies] argue against requiring spe-
cific policy features, especially ones which are cost-increasing, such as inflation protection and 
nonforfeiture, and they oppose the standardization of products as an affront to consumer choice 
and a barrier to innovation.”). 
 86 See CAL INS. CODE § 10237.1 (West 2005); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-501-20 (1998); 
760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-7-1 (2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 52.25(c)(3) (1995). 
 87 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 64, § 13, at 641-18 to -20. 
 88 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 22005.1(b)(3) (2001); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-
475-4(c)(3); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-20-38.1(a)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 11, § 39.6(b)(11) (2005).  How the new Partnership states will develop their inflation 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
Along several dimensions, the regulations governing Partnership 
LTCI were more stringent and arguably more consumer-protective 
than the regulations governing standard LTCI.  These regulations 
were not imposed from above, but instead were the result of negotia-
tions between regulators and insurance companies.89  If the regulators 
had been dissatisfied with the types of policies that the insurance com-
panies were prepared to sell, they could have refused to endorse those 
policies.  Similarly, if the proposed regulations had been too harsh, the 
insurance companies could have walked away from the table.  The 
framework established in Part II helps explain why the parties were 
able to reach an agreement. 
A.  Private Sector Benefits 
The Partnership has arguably benefited insurance companies.  To 
be sure, mandatory inflation protection provisions and other regula-
tions increase the cost to insurance companies of providing insurance.  
This presumably causes the price of policies to rise, and thus the mar-
ket shrinks as some consumers are priced out.  However, three factors 
would seem to counter this effect.  First, the costs of long-term care are 
notoriously difficult to insure against,90 and insurance companies may 
welcome financial assistance from the government in the task.  Second, 
insurance companies can expand their customer base by marketing the 
Partnership policy, which may be more attractive to consumers be-
cause it provides extended coverage.91  Potential purchasers on the 
margin may be attracted by the higher quality product.  In addition, 
because long-term care insurance companies suffered from reputa-
tional problems following the abuses that existed at the time of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
protection regulations is an interesting question.  The DRA requires compound inflation protec-
tion for purchasers under age 61, “some level of inflation protection” for those between 61 and 76, 
and for those over 76, the policy “may (but is not required to) provide some level of inflation pro-
tection.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(iii)(IV) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).  Although it appears that 
there is no wiggle room with respect to purchasers under 61, states will have discretion to define 
what “some level of inflation protection” means for the older groups. 
 89 See McCall, supra note 77, at 75 (“[E]ach state, in collaboration with the insurers, developed 
specific regulations with which Partnership policies had to comply . . . . These regulations were 
developed by the states in open forums with participation by the insurers and, in some states, by 
consumer representatives.”).  
 90 See, e.g., NICHOLAS BARR, THE WELFARE STATE AS PIGGY BANK 81–83 (2001) (detail-
ing the information problems faced by insurance companies).  This forms part of the argument for 
a social insurance approach to long-term care financing.  See id. at 83–85. 
 91 Ironically, insurance companies may have marketed against the Medicaid benefits provided 
by Partnership policies.  See Wiener, Tilly & Goldenson, supra note 26, at 89–91 (noting that con-
sumers were often attracted to LTCI as a way to avoid Medicaid and highlighting the fact that 
insurers often marketed their policies as such). 
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Partnership’s inception,92 the governmental stamp of approval implicit 
in the Partnership may have convinced some individuals to buy the in-
surance who otherwise would not have done so.  Third, because the 
four states that implemented Partnership programs allowed insurance 
companies to maintain their standard policies under the older regula-
tory regime, consumers who were more sensitive to price than to policy 
quality were not lost to the insurance companies.  Thus, insurance 
companies likely achieved a net gain in profits as a result of the Part-
nership, even if their customer base for Partnership policies was 
smaller than that for standard LTCI policies due to regulation. 
B.  Regulator Motivation 
The fact that the regulatory regimes for standard and Partnership 
policies differed seems to suggest that state regulators were not entirely 
captured by the insurance industry, even though state insurance regu-
lators are often thought of as more likely than other types of regulators 
to be captured.93  Consumer protection, however, was likely not the 
primary motive for regulators to pursue more stringent Partnership 
regulations; otherwise, they would have regulated standard LTCI 
products in a similarly consumer-protective way.  In the case of Part-
nership policies, the government had an additional financial interest in 
making sure that insurance companies were providing an insurance 
product that adequately financed the front end of long-term care ex-
penses.  The presence of this rationale may have moved regulators to 
act in a more aggressive way based on some preexisting ideology, or 
there might have been pressure from the legislative or executive 
branches of the state to regulate in a way that saved the state money.  
The important fact is that there was a persuasive rationale available 
for those regulators who wished to respond to it. 
C.  Alignment of Interests 
In the case of the Partnership, the governmental interest in ensur-
ing that private insurance was adequate to cover the costs of long-term 
care during the period in which the private sector was responsible for 
it may have aligned with a consumer interest in having high quality 
policies singled out for endorsement, both symbolically and financially, 
by the government.  Whether such regulations are optimal for con-
sumer welfare or whether a less paternalistic approach would be more 
appropriate is open to debate,94 but given the continued existence of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See supra p. 1379. 
 93 See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 639–41 (1999) 
(discussing the particular problems of capture in the insurance context). 
 94 See supra note 84. 
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standard LTCI policies with less stringent requirements, it is likely 
that consumer freedom of choice was not harmed in a significant way. 
D.  The Future of the Partnership 
Many of the aspects of the Partnership that contributed to the 
promulgation of consumer-protective regulation may be absent going 
forward.  First, insurance companies may be less willing to enter the 
Partnership, seeing fewer benefits than before.  The DRA requires that 
states creating a Partnership apply the same regulations to Partnership 
policies as they apply to standard policies.95  If insurance companies 
were forced to make all of their products comply with the stringent 
regulations currently applicable to Partnership policies, the Partner-
ship would presumably be less profitable for them.  In addition, insur-
ance companies have been disappointed with the sales of Partnership 
policies thus far, even though there is evidence that sales of LTCI poli-
cies in the four pilot Partnership states were somewhat better than 
sales in non-Partnership states.96  Consequently, insurance companies 
may perceive the costs of complying with stringent regulations that 
differ from state to state as exceeding the benefits of entering into the 
Partnership. 
Second, it is not clear that the Partnership actually saves the gov-
ernment money,97 and so one of the government’s rationales for enter-
ing into the Partnership may no longer apply.  Without such a ration-
ale, public-interested regulators may be less motivated to pursue 
regulation that could be consumer-protective, or they may overregulate 
in hopes of shifting enough risk to the private sector to make the Part-
nership cost-saving for the government.  The latter of these two possi-
bilities could actually harm consumers or lead insurance companies to 
withdraw from the Partnership or the LTCI market altogether. 
Finally, given the DRA’s requirement that regulations apply 
equally across standard and Partnership policies, it is unclear whether 
new Partnership states will pursue regulations similar to those pursued 
by the original Partnership states.  Determining the proper amount of 
regulation involves a careful balancing of priorities, often requiring the 
government to take into account input from the insurance industry 
about the nature of the market and consumer demand.  If consumer-
protective regulations akin to the ones promulgated in California, 
Connecticut, Indiana, and New York would increase costs beyond the 
reach of a large number of middle-class consumers, significantly harm-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(iii)(VII) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 96 See Kaplan, supra note 82, at 447–48. 
 97 See supra note 69. 
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ing insurance companies in the process, then regulators may hesitate 
before promulgating them. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note presents an argument that joint financing public-private 
partnerships may create situations hospitable to the promulgation of 
consumer-protective regulation in the insurance context if certain con-
ditions are met.  The opportunities for such PPPs are greatest in areas 
in which there exist fragmented financing mechanisms for the same 
social good, as is common in the areas of health and social care.  The 
Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care is suggestive of the proc-
esses detailed in this Note, although there are questions about whether 
future states implementing Partnership programs will follow a similar 
route.  Regardless, Senator Clinton and other policymakers at the state 
and federal levels should be alert to the possibilities for positive devel-
opments in insurance regulation and collaborative governance pre-
sented by joint financing public-private partnerships. 
 
